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This paper measures the size of automatic fiscal revenue stabilizers and evaluates their 
role in Latin America. The paper introduces a relatively rich tax structure into a dynamic, 
stochastic, multi-sector small open economy inhabited by rule-of-thumb consumers (who 
consume their wages and do not save or borrow) and Ricardian households to study the 
stabilizing properties of different parameters of the tax code. The economy faces multiple 
sources of business cycle fluctuations: 1) world capital market shocks; 2) world business 
cycle shocks; 3) terms of trade shocks; 4) government spending shocks; and 5) 
nontradable and 6) tradable sector technology innovations. Calibrating the model 
economy to a typical Latin American economy allows the evaluation of its ability to 
mimic the region’s observed business cycle frequency properties and the assessment of 
the quantitative relationship between tax code parameters, business cycle forcing 
variables and business cycle behavior. The model captures many of the salient features of 
Latin America’s business cycle facts and finds that the degree of smoothing provided by 
the automatic revenue stabilizers - described by various properties of the tax system - is 
negligible. Moreover, government size - measured by the GDP ratio of government 
spending - plays the role of an automatic stabilizer but its smoothing effect is very weak. 
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A climate of mistrust towards discretionary fiscal policy is growing in Latin America. De 
Ferranti, Perry, Gill and Servén (2000) found that a significant fraction of Latin 
America’s excess volatility vis-à-vis industrial economies is due to fiscal policy 
volatility. The underlying reason is that fiscal policy tends to be procyclical in the region 
and, instead of smoothing economic fluctuations as in textbook macroeconomics, it 
contributes to exacerbating them. The destabilizing conduct of fiscal policy has been 
documented in various cross-country studies (Gavin et al., 1996; Gavin and Perotti, 
1997). Furthermore, Fatás and Mihov (2004), using an enlarged sample of countries, 
including some in Latin America, demonstrated a discernable positive relationship 
between discretionary fiscal policy changes and macroeconomic volatility and a negative 
one between the latter and economic growth. 
 
The distrust of fiscal activism is a widespread phenomenon in the developed world 
nowadays as is the concomitant focus, in public policy and academic circles, on an 
alternative type of fiscal policy - a non-discretionary one - based on the built-in flexibility 
of taxation and automatic stabilization. Let the fiscal automatic stabilizers work seems to 
be the new mantra being chanted in the felt need for protection from discretionary fiscal 
management. Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) and Auerbach (2002) recommend heavier 
reliance on automatic stabilizers for macroeconomic stabilization purposes for the U.S. 
given the difficulties in conducting countercyclical fiscal policy. The authors claim that 
there is little evidence that discretionary fiscal policy has been effective in smoothing 
shocks and contend that active policy changes suffer from information, political and 
economic lags. Romer and Romer (1994) reached a similar conclusion in a study of the 
contribution of monetary and fiscal policies to the ending of eight U.S. postwar 
recessions. Their study documented the fact that discretionary fiscal impulses have been 
too small to have had a significant role in ending downturns while automatic fiscal policy 
seemingly exhibited the magnitude, timing and consistency to have had a stabilizing 
influence in all recoveries. Taylor (2000) espoused monetary policy to do the 
countercyclical task, ‘taking as given the workings of the automatic stabilizers.’ The 
comparative advantage of monetary policy is attributed to shorter implementation lags, 
greater flexibility to adjust the policy stance and lower political constraints. Following 
the same line of reasoning, the institutional arrangement of the EMU has been set up to 
hold a strong stance against the use of discretionary fiscal policy to fine-tune the 
economy. The fiscal apparatus of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact 
require a medium-term fiscal position of ‘close to balance or in surplus’ and relies on the 
operation of automatic stabilizers as the main tool for dealing with country-specific 
shocks. 
 
The emerging public policy consensus appears to have some additional backing in the 
empirical work of Fatás and Mihov (2003), who show that fiscal policy discretion has 
harmed macroeconomic stability and caused the deterioration of long-term growth in a 
sample of OECD countries while Fatás and Mihov (2001) found a strong negative 
correlation between automatic stabilizers, proxied by government size, and output 
volatility for the same sample of OECD countries given above and for the states in the 
U.S.   3
A natural policy question then arises. Should Latin American countries follow the lead of 
developed countries in giving up the use of activist fiscal policy and focusing on 
automatic stabilization? Chile, for instance, has answered the question in the affirmative 
with the adoption of a medium-term structural surplus target of 1% of GDP. Similarly, 
according to Hemming and Ter-Minassian (2004), the IMF is proposing the adoption of 
such rules to restrict discretionary actions and protect infrastructure spending. The 
unsolved issue, however, is the degree of automatic stabilization that can be effectively 
embedded in the cyclical position of the government budget. The stakes for Latin 
America are quite high. If automatic stabilizers are weak or ineffective, various 
economies in the region will be at the mercy of a myriad of domestic and external shocks 
that frequently hit individual economies, or the region as a whole, with no stabilization 
instrument at their disposal. This would be true for fully dollarized economies such as 
Ecuador, El Salvador and Panama, or for the member countries of the Organization of 
Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) - grouped around a monetary union - since they have 
certainly lost their control over monetary policy. The numerous highly de facto dollarized 
countries (Bolivia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay, etc.) will depend 
heavily on an undermined monetary policy to dampen business cycle fluctuations while 
most of the other countries in the region that have the potential to run independent 
monetary policies may find themselves in a similar situation due to procyclical capital 
flows, financial sector inefficiencies, financial repression, banking crises, illiquid 
domestic markets, etc., or simply because monetary policy is committed to maintaining 
price stability. 
 
Two broad components of the government budget display the capacity to smooth out 
fluctuations in disposable income and consumption: the tax system and the 
unemployment insurance system. In most Latin American countries, automatic fiscal 
expenditure stabilizers are virtually shut down due to a lack of well-established welfare 
programs and/or due to a poor countercyclical design. The design of an unemployment 
compensation scheme is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, the focus is automatic 
fiscal revenue stabilizers or the tax system’s built-in flexibility. The relevant literature is 
sparse and not very informative. In the first place, I know of no previous attempt to 
measure the size of automatic stabilizers in the LAC region or even in developing 
countries. The literature has singled out just one feature of the region’s fiscal 
management: the countercyclical nature of discretionary fiscal policy, but little is known 
about the non-discretionary component. Consequently, one of the objectives of this paper 
is to provide a broader understanding of fiscal policy by quantitatively characterizing the 
main features of the non-discretionary component. 
 
Moreover, according to the existing literature, the most important determinant of the 
cyclical sensitivity of the budget is the size of the government sector. Van den Noord 
(2000) documented a strong positive relationship between the cyclical sensitivity of the 
fiscal position and government size in the OECD area, a result that makes clear why the 
existing empirical work has focused on that variable (government size), as measured by 
the expenditure or tax revenue to GDP ratio, to epitomize the overall level of stabilization 
provided by fiscal policy (Galí, 1994; Fatás and Mihov, 2001; Andrés et al., 2004; Guo 
and Harrison, 2004). The striking observation for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC) countries is that larger governments are associated with more volatile business   4
cycles. Figure 1 shows the differing effect of government size (primary expenditures to 
GDP ratio) on the amplitude of the business cycle in developed and LAC countries. 
Regardless of the volatility measure (standard deviation of the Hodrick-Prescott filtered 
log-GDP or the volatility of the growth rate of GDP) larger governments in the LAC 
region tend to be correlated with more volatile macroeconomic environments while 
exactly the opposite is observed in the developed world. 
 
The lack of understanding of the workings of automatic revenue stabilizers in developing 
countries is aggravated by the fact that the stabilizing properties of other dimensions of a 
tax system are also practically unknown. It is generally believed, for example, that a 
progressive income tax reduces fluctuations in after-tax income, but the size of its 
smoothing effect and the nature of the relationship between the degree of smoothing and 
the degree of progressivity of the income tax schedule have not been established. 
Furthermore, there are other alternative ways to introduce progressivity into a tax system 
in addition to changes in the slope of the personal income tax schedule. The personal 
exemption level exempts low-income households from paying taxes and induces a 
positive association between income and the tax-income ratio. VAT exemptions 
(spending on goods of basic necessity, for instance) may induce a similar pattern. Is this 
type of progressivity stabilizing? Tax revenue composition or more generally, the 
revenue sensitivity properties of different taxes, may play a smoothing role too, but their 
structural relationship with the business cycle has not been clarified. My reading of the 
existing empirical work is that the effect of all these variables has been hidden behind the 
(government) size variable. This acts as a summarizing measure of various stabilizing 
properties of the tax system, but the independent roles of each one have not been 
disentangled. An attempt will be made in this paper to identify those features of a tax 
system that enhance the operation of automatic stabilizers. In this sense, this paper is the 
first attempt to look into the microfoundations of automatic revenue stabilization in 
developing countries. In particular, the paper tries to answer a normative question: How 
can policymakers improve automatic stabilization? Is it plausible to make automatic 
stabilizers in developing countries more effective? 
 
Automatic revenue stabilizers are also commonly measured as a weighted sum of 
elasticities of specific tax categories with respect to a change in income with weights 
given by the relative size of the corresponding tax collection. If elasticities are unitary, 
the measure boils down to the tax/GDP ratio. Both the government’s size indicator and 
this weighted sum of elasticities - the so-called cyclical sensitivity of the budget - are 
associated, in a mechanistic fashion, in the minds of policy makers as well as in the 
existing literature with the capacity of fiscal policy to offset fluctuations since an 
augmented smoothing power is attributed to a higher cyclical responsiveness of the 
budget. Note also that these measures remain invariant with respect to the sources of 
business cycle fluctuations, implying that automatic stabilizers, of a certain size, should 
work at all times and everywhere with the same effectiveness. However, there is no 
research backing up this conjecture. In principle, a traditional Keynesian argument would 
provide a rationale for that hypothesis: any demand shock triggers automatic responses in 
taxes representing a countercyclical demand impulse via after-tax income. As originally 
conceived by Keynesians, a pure demand-driven business cycle is the ideal environment 
for the smooth operation of the fiscal revenue stabilizers. But, how do automatic   5
stabilizers operate when other forces drive the business cycle, as is the case of Latin 
America? What happens when shocks have relevant demand as well as supply 
dimensions? Mendoza (1995), in a study of the relationship between terms of trade 
shocks and business cycles, found that 56% of the observed volatility of GDP in 
developing countries was explained by terms of trade shocks. Kose (2002), also within an 
intertemporal general equilibrium framework, assessed the role of world prices in driving 
business cycles fluctuations in developing countries and found that shocks to the world 
real interest rate along with shocks to the world prices of capital, intermediate and 
primary goods account for 88% of aggregate output fluctuations. The question is: Do 
automatic stabilizers work equally well under any cyclical circumstances, as the summary 
indicators of the cyclical sensitivity of the budget seem to suggest? What does “Let the 
fiscal automatic stabilizers work” mean in an economy facing multiple sources business 
cycle fluctuations? 
 
To answer the questions that have been posed, a relatively rich tax structure is introduced 
into a stochastic, dynamic, multi-sector, small open economy model to study the 
stabilizing properties of different parameters of the tax code. The tax structure partially 
builds upon Jonsson and Klein (1996), Guo and Lansing (1998) and Cassou and Lansing 
(2004) who attempted to provide a reasonable portrayal of income taxation by 
introducing tax progressivity into a representative-agent dynamic general equilibrium 
setting. Some of the features of the modeled tax system are the following: 1) three 
general types of government revenue: consumption, personal income and business 
income taxes; 2) different rates applied to personal and business income; 3) graduated 
personal income tax rates; 4) expensing of new physical capital investment; 5) personal 
income exemption level and 6) a level exemption in the consumption tax base. At the 
same time, an attempt is made to capture the major features of the region’s business cycle 
by including six sources of fluctuations: 1) world capital market shocks; 2) world 
business cycle shocks; 3) terms of trade shocks; 4) government spending shocks and 5) 
nontradable and 6) tradable sector technology innovations. Calibrating the model 
economy to a typical LAC economy allows an evaluation of its ability to mimic the 
region’s observed business cycle fluctuations and an assessment of the quantitative 
relationship between tax code parameters, business cycle forcing variables and business 
cycle behavior. In related work, Galí (1994), Andrés et al. (2004) and Guo and Harrison 
(2004) developed dynamic general equilibrium models to evaluate the role of automatic 
stabilizers in much the same vein as the exercise proposed here. However, in those 
models there was only one source of business fluctuations (technology shocks), only one 
property of the tax system being analyzed (government size), and the economy is closed. 
A richer menu of tax parameters is evaluated by Andrés and Doménech (2003) in a 
closed economy version of a representative European economy driven solely by 
technology shocks. 
 
In contrast to standard small open economy models (Mendoza, 1991; Correia et al., 1995; 
Senhadji, 1998; Kose, 2002; etc.) an economy is presented where decision-making is 
decentralized into the hands of households and firms. This modeling choice allows the 
effect of distortionary corporate taxation on businesses and the effect of both the level 
and slope of the personal income tax schedule on household behavior to be appraised. 
Standard small open economy models with a government sector generally prevent the   6
government from borrowing or allow for lump-sum taxation in which case, by a 
Ricardian Equivalence type of argument, government debt is irrelevant. A version of 
Ricardian equivalence holds true in the present model as well. The standard small open 
economy model is also extended to introduce agent heterogeneity along the lines of 
Mankiw’s (2000) Savers-Spenders Theory of Public Finance. In the economy, spenders 
or low-wealth households who follow the rule-of-thumb of consuming their disposable 
income every period and do not save or borrow thus rendering consumption smoothing 
unfeasible, and savers or Ricardian consumers or high-wealth households who smooth 
their consumption over time by trading in physical and financial assets, and act in an 
optimizing, forward-looking manner coexist. Mankiw (2000) introduces this sort of 
heterogeneity to overcome the failure of the Barro-Ramsey model (and the Diamond-
Samuelson model) to explain why consumption closely follows the evolution of current 
income and the fact that the net worth of many households is near zero. LAC countries 
are also confronted with these undeniable facts. There is also a growing body of literature 
showing that this form of heterogeneity provides insights into the effect of 
macroeconomic policies which happens to be consistent with other observed facts at the 
macro level (see Galí et al., 2004; Andrés et al., 2004; Matsen et al., 2004). 
 
The outline of the paper is the following. Section 2 briefly describes the methodology and 
provides estimates of the size of the automatic fiscal revenue stabilizers in Latin America. 
In order to facilitate the comparison, the same approach is used to compute developed 
country indicators. Section 3 describes the model economy and Section 4 discusses 
calibration. Section 5 performs simulations and evaluates the stabilization role of 
different tax code parameters by comparing the volatility of output under alternative tax 
structures and sources of fluctuations with the volatility of an economy with lump-sum 
taxation. Finally, Section 6 provides some conclusions. 
 
 
2. THE SIZE OF AUTOMATIC REVENUE STABILIZERS IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
The focus in this section is on the measurement of the sensitivity of the budget balance to 
the cycle in the LAC region and this is compared with figures for developed countries. 
The European Commission, the IMF, the OECD, as well as various national authorities, 
routinely compute budget sensitivities in order to facilitate the evaluation of budgetary 
policies and, for that specific endeavor, have developed a number of widely differing 
methodologies. Two measures are presented here. The first loosely builds upon the 
OECD approach and relies on the estimates of tax proceeds and tax base elasticities, 
henceforth referred to as the “SBB” indicator. The second loosely builds upon Pechman’s 
(1973) measure of a tax system’s built-in flexibility, henceforth abbreviated as “PI”. 
 
The sensitivity of the budget balance to the cycle (SBB) is operationally defined as the 
change in the primary budget balance (relative to potential GDP) in response to a 1% 
cyclical deviation of GDP from trend: 




















where starred variables represent potential or trend levels. 
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t B  stands for the cyclically 
disturbed primary budget balance. The budget balance variable included in the preceding 
definition  ) B   and   (B t
y
t
∗  can be expressed in terms of its defining revenue and expenditure 
categories where, in principle, each budgetary category may or may not be cyclically 
sensitive. After simple manipulations, the preceding semi-elasticity can be rewritten in 
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where 
i R ε   ) (ε
j E  is the elasticity of the corresponding budgetary category ( i R , 
n , ... 1, i = , for revenues and  j E,  m , ... 1, j = , for expenditures) with respect to its base 
and 
i R η   ) (η
j E  is the elasticity of the corresponding macroeconomic base with respect to 
(cyclical) economic activity. n revenue categories and m expenditure categories are 
found to be cyclically responsive. 
*
i ) Y R (  ) ) Y E (( j
∗  represents the average size of the 
corresponding budgetary category relative to the size of the economy (GDP). In the 
ensuing analysis, the second term on the right-hand side of the equation is dropped 
because cyclically-sensitive expenditures in the LAC region (mainly unemployment-
related expenditures) are poorly designed or very small or time series data are lacking. 
This choice also reflects the concern here for the stabilizing role of the tax system and not 
that of the benefit system. For the sake of comparison, developed country sensitivities are 
calculated the same way.
1 
 
Based on the definitions adopted in the IMF Government Finance Statistics database, five 
revenue categories are acknowledged to be dependent upon the cycle: 1) taxes on income, 
profits and capital gains; 2) taxes on goods and services; 3) taxes on international trade; 
4) social security contributions and 5) other taxes.
2 Fiscal elasticities are obtained from 
country-by-country regressions for each revenue category i (in real terms) as: 
 
{ } 1,...,5 i ζ Z γ )) d(log(b ε α )) d(log(R t t
T
t i, R t i, i = + + + =  
 
                                                           
1 Unemployment-related expenditures are small in developed countries. For instance, this budget category 
amounts to 1.3% of GDP in the Euro area and 1.4% in the EU-15 countries in 1999. However, it is highly 
responsive to cyclical variations in output (Bouthevillain et al., 2001). 
2 Zero elasticity with respect to the business cycle is implicitly attached to other government revenue 
categories.   8
where  t i, b  is the relevant, real economic base of the tax and Z is a vector of other 
explanatory variables. Data availability restricts the choice of tax bases. The GDP is 
assumed to be the relevant macroeconomic base for tax categories  5} 4, {1, i = ; final 
household consumption, the base for  {2} i =  and total imports, for  {3} i = . The vector Z 
includes other determinants of the rate of growth of real tax proceeds such as the inflation 
rate
3 (in logs or log difference) and terms of trade (in logs or log difference). 
Unfortunately, due to data limitations on tax law changes over time, the regression does 
not control for discretionary policy measures thus rendering elasticity estimates not 
completely reliable.
4 An additional potential source of bias is the use of the OLS 
estimation technique, which ignores the effect of the fiscal position on the cyclical 
behavior of macroeconomic aggregates thus yielding biased estimates. To deal with the 
endogeneity problem, the instrumental variable estimation procedure is used. This uses 
the U.S. GDP (log difference) and the first lag of the inflation rate and terms of trade 
variables as instruments. 
 
Annual tax data series generally spanning the period from 1972 to 2000 and generally 
comprising what the IMF defines as ‘consolidated central government’ come from the 
Government Finance Statistics database and IMF country reports. The remaining data 
were retrieved from the World Development Indicators database (World Bank). Output 
elasticities of various macroeconomic bases were obtained from OLS regressions of 




In the other methodology, Pechman (1973) estimates the responsiveness of the U.S. tax 
system to fluctuations in income using a sample of historical individual federal income 
tax returns to simulate the impact on tax liabilities of a dollar increase in personal 
income. Pechman refers to this measure as the tax system’s “built-in flexibility” and 
Auerbach and Feenberg (2000), as the “normalized tax change.” Lacking the specific 
information needed to perform a similar calculation for LAC countries, an aggregate 
version of the relationship between tax revenue and income is computed here by defining 
it as the mean of the yearly ratios of the absolute increase in total tax revenue to the 
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where  1 N +  is the sample size and  ) Δ(R t  is the absolute change in total tax revenue 
between periods  1 - t  and t . Unfortunately, the PI indicator is also tainted by the problem 
                                                           
3 The inflation rate is defined as inflation rate/(1+inflation rate). 
4 In stricto sensu, this is not a tax elasticity measure but a tax buoyancy measure. The latter incorporates the 
impact of any discretionary changes in tax rates on revenue collection data. By definition, buoyancy does 
not control for discretionary changes in the tax structure. 
5 In some cases the described general methodology to compute SBB did not work satisfactorily. In those 
cases Hodrick-Prescott filtered (logged) series (budget categories, tax bases and output) are used to 
estimate elasticities.   9
of tax law changes. Figure 2 depicts the two measures of the cyclical sensitivity of the 
fiscal position. The figure relates both statistics with the government size variable 
(primary expenditures to GDP ratio) - which is generally used as a proxy for the size of 
automatic stabilizers - for 16 Latin American
6 and 24 developed countries
7. The figure 
corroborates Van den Noord’s (2000) finding of a strong positive correlation in 
developed countries, indicating that the size of government is the key force determining 
the cyclical sensitivity of the fiscal position. Though a note of caution is in order based 
on what was discussed in the preceding paragraphs, both indicators are suggestive of 
much weaker automatic fiscal revenue stabilizers in Latin America than in the developed 
world. 
 
This message is broadly consistent with two additional pieces of widely known 
information which, by definition, are incorporated into the construction of the preceding 
indicators: government size (figure 3) and the structure of taxation (figure 4). Figure 3 
shows that governments (tax revenue or primary expenditures to GDP ratio) are bigger in 
developed countries and figure 4 shows that the relative share of taxation of cyclically-
sensitive tax bases and/or the degree of progressivity of the tax system, proxied by the 
share of income taxes, is greater in developed countries. These figures also indicate that 
automatic stabilizers should tend to be stronger in developed countries than in the LAC 
region. All in all, a new piece of evidence has been added to the small stack of evidence 
on LAC fiscal policy. Not only has discretionary fiscal policy been reported to be 
procyclical, but automatic fiscal stabilizers have also been found to be weak by two 
alternative methods and ancillary indicators. 
 
Based on the existing evidence, it is possible to draw a corollary, that discretionary fiscal 
policy and automatic stabilizers move in opposite directions along the business cycle in 
the LAC region. In developed countries, both types of fiscal policy probably tend to 
reinforce each other. A time series of automatic revenue stabilizers  ) (ASt  is obtained 






















































where  t i, b  is the relevant macroeconomic base for tax category i and 
*
t i, b , 
*
t i, R  and 
*
t Y 
are Hodrick-Prescott trend components of the tax base, tax revenue and GDP, 
respectively. A time series of discretionary fiscal policy is obtained by subtracting the 
automatic stabilizers estimate from the observed primary budget surplus (relative to 
potential GDP), 
                                                           
6 The sample of LAC countries includes 16 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. 
7 The sample of industrial countries includes: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.   10







































A shortcoming in this methodology lies in attributing to discretionary policy all changes 
in the budgetary position that are not associated with the business cycle. Therefore, 
results should be taken with a grain a salt. Figure 5 does provide support in favor of the 
stated conjecture. As shown in Figure 5, there is a negative correlation between the two 
components of fiscal policy in 16 out of the 17 LAC countries in the sample. Within the 
developed world positive correlations are more commonly observed though, in a number 
of these countries, discretionary fiscal policy also exhibits a procyclical pattern. 
 
Finally, an additional intuition about the strength of automatic stabilization or the degree 
of flexibility embedded in the tax system can be gained by looking at the responsiveness 
of the automatic fiscal revenue stabilizers to changes in cyclical conditions. To that end, a 
variant (including terms of trade) of the policy rule used by Galí and Perotti (2003) is 
estimated on a country-by-country basis: 
 
t 1 t L 1 t D t P t t ζ AS γ D γ P γ CY β α AS + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = − −  
 
where  t CY  represents the output gap measured by the Hodrick-Prescott cyclical 
component of log-GDP;  t P  stands for the terms of trade (in level, in log or in log 
difference, depending on unit root tests);  t D  is the stock of outstanding public debt in 
ratio to potential GDP and where the potential GDP is in turn obtained from the Hodrick-
Prescott trend component. The public debt time series for each country is estimated by 
using information on the debt-GDP ratio at a given point in time and using time series 
data on the overall budget balance and GDP along with the law of motion of government 
debt to reconstruct the entire path. The government debt-GDP ratio at a given point in 
time is retrieved from the FitchResearch database and Moody’s. The coefficient β  
measures the size of automatic movements in the revenue ledger accounts of the 
government budget in response to changes in cyclical conditions. The simultaneity bias 
associated with the potential problem of endogeneity of the output gap variable is 
addressed by instrumenting for it with its lagged value and the first lag of the U.S. output 
gap (or the first lag of the three major European economies’ output gap for the U.S. 
regression). 
 
Figure 6 depicts country-specific estimates of the output gap coefficient of the fiscal 
reaction function. Without exception, all industrial countries exhibit a statistically 
significant response from the revenue budget items to automatically counteract domestic 
cyclical fluctuations. In Latin America very few countries exhibit a significant response. 
When it is significant, it is much weaker than in the developed country sample. In 
general, the region as a whole tends to have a barely acyclical non-discretionary fiscal 
policy. 
 
   11
3. THE MODEL 
 
The model economy to be studied is open, small and stochastic. Consider an economy 
populated by a continuum of infinitely lived households uniformly distributed on the unit 
interval 1] , [0 , a continuum of identical firms and a government sector. A fraction π of 
households with names on the interval  ) π , [0 , referred to as spenders and identified by 
the subscript  r , choose current labor supply at the competitive wage rate and consume 
their disposable labor income in order to maximize period-by-period utility. The 
remaining share  π) (1−  of households with names on  1] , [π , referred to as optimizing 
households and identified by the subscript  o , maximize their lifetime expected utility by 
transferring resources across periods and from one generation to another by using capital 
markets. Two goods are produced in the economy: nontradables, identified by the 
superscript 
n , and exportables, identified by 
x . Two goods are consumed: nontradables 
and importables, 
m . The importable good, which plays the role of numéraire, can be used 
for final household consumption and investment and for intermediate consumption in the 
production process. The volume of exports depends on relative prices (terms of trade) and 
on the GDPs of LAC trading partners and thus on the international business cycle. The 
Ricardian households have access to the world financial market for one-period real 
bonds. The representative LAC economy takes the world prices of exports and imports as 
well as the world interest rate as given parametrically. The world interest rate, the world 
business cycle and the terms of trade, as well as other additional forcing processes to be 
introduced shortly, are assumed to follow a stationary, first order, vector Markov process. 
 
The following model economy is expressed in per capita terms and no population growth 
is allowed. Following convention, economy wide, per capita aggregates are represented 
by capital letters while variables under the household’s control, not including prices, are 
denoted by lower case letters. In equilibrium individual choices and the corresponding 
aggregate counterparts should be identical. Time is discrete and indexed by t , 
∞ = , 2, 1, 0, t K . 
 
3.1 Optimizing Households 
 
The representative optimizing household has preferences over sequences of consumption 
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The representative household draws utility from a composite consumption good  t o, c a n d  
from leisure time  t o, l . The composite consumption good is a combination of two goods 
treated as imperfect substitutes by a CES Armington aggregator: consumption of   12
nontradable goods 
n
t o, c  and consumption of importable goods 
m
t o, c . The parameter α is a 
preference weight on nontradable goods and υ,  1 υ − > , determines the elasticity of 
substitution between domestic and importable consumption goods given by  υ) (1 1 + . β  
is a subjective discount factor and ξ governs the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in 
labor supply.  0 E  is the mathematical expectations operator conditional on information 
available at time 0 . 
 
The Ricardian household faces the following flow budget constraint: 
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t o,  and 
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t o, i   ) (i
mx
t o,  represent the investment of the nontradable (importable) 
good in the nontradable and exportable producing sectors, respectively. 
n
t w   ) (w
x
t  and 
n
t r  
) (r
x
t  are the wage rate and the rental price of capital in the nontradable (exportable) 
sector. 
j
t o, n ,  x} {n, j= , denotes labor input allocated to producing sector  j. 
n
t o, k) (k
x
t o,  is 
the stock of physical capital owned exclusively by optimizing households and allocated 
to firms in the nontradable (exportable) sector. 
n
t p  and 
x
t p  are the relative price of 
nontradables and the terms of trade, respectively.  t o, t  stands for tax payments to the 
government, to be described in detail below.  t TR  is a time t  lump-sum government 
transfer to the household.  t o, b  is the beginning-of-period holdings of government bonds 
with an endogenous rate of return 
b
t r.   t o, d  is net foreign debt at the beginning of period t  
and 
d
t r  is the interest rate, in terms of imports, charged on foreign debt. The interest rate 








∗ r  is the constant world interest rate and  t s  is an exogenous stochastic borrowing 
premium. All assets and debts are held by Ricardian households (and the government). 
 
It is well known that the equilibrium dynamics of a small open economy, with asset 
trading restricted to a noncontingent bond, exhibit a random walk property that prevents 
the use of local approximation methods to study the business cycle behavior of the 
economy around a stationary growth path. To induce stationarity in the equilibrium 
dynamics, convex portfolio adjustment costs, which help to pin down the steady state 
level of foreign debt, are introduced. Adjustment costs are represented by the term 
] [d Ψ t o,
d  and the following parametric specification is used: 
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The household’s total time endowment is normalized to unity per period and time spent 
in employment is subject to the constraint: 
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Holdings of physical capital obey the following law of motion: 
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where 
j δ  is the depreciation rate of capital in sector  j,  ] [ Ψ
kj ⋅  is a standard quadratic 
adjustment cost function in investment, characterized by a single parameter 
kj ψ  
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Gross investment in sector  j is a composite of nontradable and foreign goods which are 
considered imperfect substitutes according to an Armington aggregator expressed in the 
CES form: 
 


















j χ  is a scaling factor, 
j φ  is a weight specifying the relative nontradable content of 
investment and 
j ν , 1 ν
j − > , governs the elasticity of substitution between domestic and 




The restricted households solve a simple static problem since they live hand-to-mouth 
and hence do not make intertemporal decisions. Formally, consumption allocations 
between domestic and importable goods and labor supply are chosen so as to solve this 
problem 
 
                                                           
8 Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) prove that alternative stationarity-inducing approaches (for instance, 
endogenous discount factor or debt-elastic interest-rate premium) yield exactly the same dynamics at 
business cycle frequencies. It remains to be shown, however, whether their result carries over into richer 
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The notation and setup of the problem are quite straightforward. Savers and spenders 
have identical period utility functions and because their labor effort is perfectly 




The two sectoral technologies have a CES specification given by 
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so they exhibit constant returns to scale. 
j λ  is a sectoral scale parameter. 
mj
t S  represents 
imported intermediate inputs in sector  j and 
j ζ  is the relative weight on capital in the 
aggregation of capital and intermediate input services. The elasticity of substitution 
between intermediate inputs and capital is controlled by 
j ω . 
j γ  is the labor income share 
in sector  j output. 
j
t Z  is an exogenous technology shock affecting total factor 
productivity in sector  j at time t . 
 
Firms solve a static program 
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The optimization problem of the firms yields the usual condition that the marginal 
productivity of primary and intermediate inputs must be equal to their rental prices: 
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3.4 Government and Tax Structure 
 








t 1 t TR T G p )B r (1 B + − + + = +  
 
where  t B  is an economywide aggregate obtained by adding up over all government bond 
holders,  t o, t B π) (1 B − = . Government expenditures include public consumption of 
nontradable goods, 
n
t G , lump-sum transfers to households and outlays associated with 
domestic government borrowing. The government only issues domestic bonds. The 
distinction between government bonds issued domestically and those issued abroad is 
inconsequential because households have unconstrained access to international 
borrowing. Households borrow on behalf of the government when they attempt to 
arbitrage away any difference between domestic and world interest rates. Government 
nontradable consumption is assumed to follow an exogenous stochastic process. 
 
Taxes paid by the two types of households  ) t , (t t r, t o,  and aggregate per-capita taxes 
collected by the government  ) (Tt  are given by the following expressions: 
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where aggregate variables are computed as a weighted average of the corresponding 
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The tax structure is determined by the government and described by a 7-dimensional 
vector ℘ of parameters,  { } η μ, , ε , ε , τ , τ , τ
p c k p c = ℘ . 
c τ  is the consumption tax rate, 
p τ  is 
the personal tax rate and 
k τ  is the corporate tax rate.  [0,1] ε
c ∈  determines the fraction of 
consumption expenditures exempted from paying consumption taxes. The amount of 
exempted expenditures does not vary over the business cycle and it is taken as given by 
the representative household. This captures the fact that spending on basic necessities, 
which is the type of spending generally exempted from VAT, does not change over the 
business cycle for the average household.  [0,1] ε
p ∈  determines the personal exemption 
level which is modeled as a fraction 
p ε  of the average pre-tax labor income and taken as 
given by the representative household. The personal deduction changes with per-capita 
labor income. μ is the fraction of investment in physical capital that can be deducted 
from corporate income. In the steady state,  1 μ =  implies that the amount ‘expensed’ is 
equal to the usual depreciation allowance for physical capital. 
 
The level and slope of the personal income tax schedule are controlled by 
p τ  and  0 η ≥  
respectively. The graduated-rate personal tax function is given by 
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When  0 η =  the tax schedule is flat and the personal income tax system does not exhibit 
progressivity. For  0 η > , households with above-average (below-average) wage incomes 
confront a higher (lower) tax rate. In equilibrium the average personal tax rate is 
p τ , 
lower than or equal to the marginal tax rate given by  η) (1 τ
p + . 
 
3.5 Resource Constraints 
 
Feasibility must be satisfied in equilibrium. The market clearing condition in the 
nontradable sector is dictated by 
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The aggregate level of net foreign debt is obtained by aggregating debts in the hands of   17
the Ricardian households:  t o, t D π) (1 D − = . Aggregate exports  t X  are demand 
determined. Foreign demand for LAC export commodities is assumed to depend on 
world economic activity 
∗
t Y  and the relative world price of exports, 
x
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where X  is the steady state level of exports, and 
∗ p ϖ  and 
∗ y ϖ  represent the price and 
income elasticity of the export demand function, respectively. Without loss of generality, 
x
t p  and 
∗
t Y  are assumed to fluctuate around their unconditional means equal to unity. 
 
 
4. STEADY STATE, CALIBRATION AND SOLUTION METHOD 
 
4.1 Parameter Values and Steady State Structure 
 
The model economy is parameterized in such a way that its long-run features mimic those 
of the representative or average LAC economy during the 1990-2000 period. In the 
steady state of the model economy, the expenditure side of the national income accounts 
matches the average LAC structure: household consumption represents 73.6% of GDP 
0.736) (Cva = , total investment 17.6%  0.176) (Iva = , government purchases of goods 
and services 14.5%  0.145) (G
n
va =  and net exports of goods and services approximately 
% 7 . 5 −  of GDP (see table 1). The model economy also matches the level and 
composition of imports. Total imports amount to 24.8% of GDP (see table 2) and are 
made up of imports of consumption goods (7% of GDP,  0.07 C
m
va = ), capital goods 









va = + ). According to the model, total output, on the production side, is 
obtained by adding the market value of goods and services produced in the nontradable 
and exportable sectors and excluding the value of (imported) goods and services used up 
in intermediate stages of production. It is assumed that the relative sectoral use of 
intermediate goods is equal to the relative sectoral contribution to value added. On the 
production side then, 82.9% of GDP is produced by the nontradable sector 
0.829) (VA
n
va =  and the rest, 17.1%, by the exportable producing sector  0.171) (VA
x
va = . 
 
The level and composition of government revenue are similar, under the benchmark 
parameterization of the model economy, to what is observed in Latin America (table 3). 
Total tax revenue in the model amounts to 15.7% of GDP, and is made up of 
consumption taxes (8.8% of GDP - very close to what is observed in the data - 
0.088 CTR va = ), corporate taxes (2.5% of GDP, or  0.025 KTR va = ) and personal 
income taxes (4.4% of GDP, including social security contributions,  0.044 PTR va = ). 
The steady state government debt-GDP ratio  ) (Bva , the economy’s external debt-GDP 
ratio ) (Dva  and the total stock of physical capital to GDP ratio  ) (Kva  are set at 0.56, 0.60   18
and 2.78, respectively, which replicate their average counterparts in the LAC region 
during the 1990s (Table 4). 
 
Due to lack of information about cross-sectoral resource allocation in the LAC region, 
total nontradable investment, importable investment and labor input are split between the 
two producing sectors in proportion to these sectors’ steady state contributions to total 
value added. The fraction of time devoted to market activities is generally set to  3 1  in 
real business cycle studies. Ellery et al. (2002), using the National Household Survey 
found that Brazilian households spent, on average, exactly  3 1  of their nonsleeping hours 
working. The sectoral allocation of labor effort is based on sectoral contributions to total 
value added, as was just mentioned. 
 
The steady state interest rate that the representative economy is charged on world capital 
markets is set at 9.5% which is the sum of two components: the exogenously given world 
interest rate  ) (r
∗ , proxied by the U.S. interest rate (4% according to Prescott, 1986, and 
Backus et al., 1994), and a borrowing premium measured by the JP Morgan Latin 
American Eurobond Index (LEI) spread. The average LEI spread amounted to 550 basis 
points 0.055) (s =  over the 1994-2001 period. The parameter β  can be set to 0.913 by 
exploiting the relationship between the subjective discount rate and the interest rate that 
arises from the steady state version of the household’s first order conditions 
s)) r (1 β (1 + + =
∗ . Note that the length of a model period is one year. 
 
For a sample of developing countries, Ostry and Reinhart (1992) estimate the elasticity of 
substitution between nontradables and importables in consumption to be 1.279. This 
implies a value for υ equal to -0.22. From the equilibrium versions of the household’s 
first order conditions for 
n
t c  and 
m
t c , evaluated at the steady state, and setting relative 
























va C  and 
n
va C  are the average shares of imported and nontradable consumption 
expenditures in total value added respectively. All the information on the right-hand side 
is known, in particular, the structure of the model economy described above. Then set 
0.853 α = . Lacking specific evidence on the elasticity of substitution between 
nontradable and importable goods in investment, I use Ostry and Reinhart’s (1992) 
consumption elasticity estimate as an alternative. This implies  0.22 ν ν
x n − = = . 
 
Using the first order conditions for 
nn
t i,  
nx
t i,  
mn
t i and 
mx
t i , evaluated at the steady state, it is 
possible to express 
n φ  and 
x φ  in terms of known magnitudes: 






















Thus, set  0.62 φ φ
x n = = . The split of investment aggregates between the two producing 
sectors is based on sectoral contributions to total value added. Using the specification of 























This implies  1.926 χ χ
x n = = . By exploiting standard properties of the production 
function, an expression for the labor share of output can be obtained: 
 















The marginal product of capital in sector j, 
j r , can be computed from the steady state 
version of the first order condition for 
j
1 t k + . This calculation, in turn, requires information 
on the depreciation rate. An average depreciation rate is obtained from the steady state 
version of the law of motion of the aggregate stock of physical capital: 
0.063 K I δ va va = = . Assume 
x n δ δ δ = = . 
j
va K  is obtained from the corresponding 




va δ I K = . Hence set  0.50 γ γ
x n = = . 
 
Using the first order condition for 
mj
t S ,  { } x n, j = , of the firm’s optimization problem, the 
following expression for the weight parameter of capital in the CES-type aggregator of 
capital and imported, intermediate input services, 
j ζ , can be found: 
 





























The unknown parameter 
j ω  is calibrated using Berndt and Wood’s (1975) estimate of the 
Allen elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs and capital goods 
0.58) (σks = . Then, 
j ω  is given by (see Sato, 1967): 
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=    20
x n ω ω =  is set at 0.265. As a result, set  0.90 ζ ζ
x n = = . 
 
The preference parameter ξ  governing the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor 
supply is set equal to 1.60, consistent with an elasticity of 1.7 adopted by Greenwood et 
al. (1988) as a reasonable compromise. The parameter κ was calibrated from the 
conditions with respect to 
n
t n  and 
x
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Note that this expression includes various tax code parameters. The benchmark tax 
structure is calibrated as follows. Implicit effective tax rates are calculated using these 


































Due to the lack of detailed and reliable data about important features of the tax codes in 
the region, it is necessary to assign somewhat arbitrary, though plausible, values to 
various policy parameters. However, the objective of the study in the next section is to try 
to remedy this faulty calibration procedure by assessing, on the basis of a thorough 
sensitivity analysis, how the business cycle properties of the economy change along with 
changes in the different parameters of the tax code. The slope of the personal income tax 
schedule for the representative LAC economy, η, is set equal to 0.
9 The tax code 
parameters 
p ε  and 
c ε , which represent the fractions of personal income and consumption 
that are tax deductible or exempted from taxation are set at  0.50 ε
p =  and  0.20 ε
c = , 
respectively.  μ, the fraction of physical investment that can be deducted from taxable 
business income, is set equal to 1. Once these parameter values are set, the remaining 
fiscal parameters can be calibrated. Set  0.15 τ
c = , 0.095 τ
k =  and  0.157 τ
p = . After 
putting this information together, set κ as equal to 3.24. The computation of the real 
wage to output ratio in the preceding expression defining 
p τ  is based on the definition of 
the labor income share in output. 
 
The scaling parameter 
j λ  is calibrated by using the specified production technology and 
                                                           
9 For comparison, Cassou and Lansing (2003) econometrically estimate the parameters for the U.S. income 
tax schedule. Their results yield a slope parameter of  0.214 η = .   21
an assumption about the size of the economy. Thus, total value added is normalized at 
100. This merely amounts to a choice of units and does not affect the cyclical properties 
of the model. Set  14.86 λ λ
x n = = . Export demand elasticities are taken from Senhadji 
and Montenegro (1999) who report estimates for individual developing countries. Table 5 
summarizes their estimates for LAC countries. The average long-run price and income 
elasticities are -1.25 and 1.06, respectively. 
 
The proportion of restricted households  ) π (  is taken from López et al. (2000). These 
authors provide panel data estimates for the proportion of non-Ricardian consumers in 
developing countries in the range of 60%-64%. Set  0.60 π = . To compute the steady 
















m C C C = = . Table 6 
summarizes the results of the calibration exercise. 
 
It remains to calibrate the stochastic structure of the economy. Shocks are jointly 









t t t G , Z , Z , s , p , Y Z
∗ = , has the following time series representation: 
 
Ω ςς E 0, ς E with ς Z log Ξ Z log Ξ) (I Z log
T
t 1 t t 1 t t 1 t = = + + − = + + +  
 
The elements of  t ς  are normally distributed and uncorrelated with  q t ς − , 0 q > , and the 
eigenvalues of Ξ all lie inside the unit circle. Z is the vector of unconditional means 
given by 
T 14.5] 1, 1, 0.055, 1, [1, Z = . The autocorrelation matrix Ξ and the variance-
covariance matrix of innovations Ω  are computed individually for nine LAC countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico and Peru) 
and then averaged to get a representative estimates for the region. The entries in the 
autocorrelation matrix and in the main diagonal of matrix Ω  are obtained from fitting 
univariate AR(1) processes. The remaining parameters - the off-diagonal elements of Ω  - 
are computed by using the residual terms of these regressions. The exceptions are the 
covariances associated with the LEI spread  t s  for which there is not sufficiently long, 
annual time series information. 
∗
t Y  is measured by the U.S. per capita GDP and taken 
from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) database;  t s  is the average 
LAC LEI spread taken from the JP Morgan bond database; individual country data for the 
terms of trade  ) (p
x
t  and government spending  ) (G
n
t  as well as the data required to 




t  are retrieved from the WDI database. Solow 
residuals are estimated as in Kose (2002). The set of yearly data generally spans the 
period from 1972 to 2000. The results of this parameterization strategy are summarized 
by the following matrices: 






















0.91 0 0 0 0 0
0 0.93 0 0 0 0
0 0 0.86 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.76 0 0
0 0 0 0 0.67 0
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0.1850 0.0106 0.0406 0 0.0326 (0.0130)
0.0636 (0.0220) 0 0.0335 0.0144






4.2 Solution Method 
 
There is no analytical solution to the described optimization problem. To obtain an 
approximate solution, the system of first order conditions is log-linearized around its 
deterministic steady state and the resulting multivariate, linear, rational expectations 
equation system is solved numerically with the Quadratic Determinantal Equation 
method developed by Binder and Pesaran (1995, 1997). 
 
 
5. SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
5.1 Cyclical Properties 
 
Before using an experimental simulation of the model economy to assess the stabilizing 
role of different parameters of the tax code, I first address the question of whether the 
model is able to mimic the observed cyclical behavior of the economies in the LAC area. 
The purpose of this section is to compare the cyclical behavior of the simulated 
economies with that of the representative LAC economy. Table 7 presents the statistics 
summarizing the cyclical properties of three economies: the representative LAC economy 
which has a cyclical behavior that is simply the average of the observed behavior across 
LAC economies and two artificial economies: the benchmark economy where Ricardian 
and myopic consumers coexist and a Barro-Ramsey type economy inhabited by fully 
optimizing households. The artificial model economies are subject to all six sources of 
business cycle fluctuations. 
 
As usual in this literature, the business cycle properties are described by a set of 
unconditional second moments: 1) the relative amplitude of fluctuations in aggregate 
variables (relative standard deviation of each aggregate to the standard deviation of 
GDP); 2) the contemporaneous correlations of aggregate variables with output and 3) the   23
persistence of macroeconomic aggregates, measured by the first order autocorrelation. To 
compute statistics, all variables, except GDP ratios, are expressed in per capita terms and 
logged and then, all are filtered using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with the smoothing 
parameter set at 100, the value commonly used for annual data. Statistics for the 
simulated economies are the means of statistics computed for each of 200 replications. 
Each simulation is 228 periods long and the first 200 observations are dropped so that the 
results do not depend on initial conditions. Second moments are computed using the 
remaining 28 observations - equal to the average sample size of 28 yearly periods of the 
database used to compute Latin America’s business cycle facts. 
 
In general, the benchmark model economy matches the core of business cycle frequency 
properties for the typical LAC economy. The ability of the benchmark model economy to 
mimic key qualitative aspects related to persistence and comovements in actual cyclical 
behavior is remarkable. The model correctly predicts that disposable income, 
consumption and investment are strongly procyclical while the trade balance to output 
ratio as well as the government debt to output ratio behave countercyclically. Even from 
a quantitative point of view, the model is quite successful in replicating some of these 
cyclical correlations. The model also accounts for the strong persistence observed in most 
macroeconomic aggregates. 
 
The model matches the relative volatility of disposable income but does not quite succeed 
in reproducing the volatility of consumption and tax revenue.
10 However, the inability to 
mimic these features cannot be considered a major failure of the model. The volatility of 
consumption is overestimated in the data because it includes durable goods consumption 
which tends to behave more like investment and, therefore, to exhibit much higher 
volatility. Tax revenue volatility is understated because the model does not allow for tax 
disturbances. WoldeMariam and Stotsky (2002) report significant changes in the region’s 
tax systems over the last two decades. As a result, the inclusion of stochastic tax changes 
may not only increase the predicted volatility of tax revenue but also that of consumption. 
This avenue is not pursued here because the primary objective of the paper is to evaluate 
the automatic stabilization role of a given tax structure. 
 
Interestingly, the model economy inhabited exclusively by Ricardian households yields 
very similar unconditional second moments. There is only one important difference to 
underscore. When the fraction of low-wealth households is 0.60  0.60) (π = , the 
(benchmark) model economy counterfactually predicts that tax revenues are 
countercyclical. Instead, the Ricardian economy  0) (π =  displays a significantly larger 
procyclicality of tax proceeds, roughly in line with observed behavior in the region. As 
shown below, the volatility levels predicted by the two economies are quite different and 
conditioned by both the tax structure and the source of fluctuations. 
 
As in the data, the model correctly predicts a high positive correlation between 
government spending and output. This prediction remains unchanged when using the first 
difference filter instead of the Hodrick-Prescott filter to detrend simulated government 
                                                           
10 The capital adjustment cost parameter 
kx ψ  is calibrated so as to match the volatility of investment 
generated by the model to that of aggregate investment in the data.      24
spending and output. The match of this feature is very interesting not only because some 
authors have claimed that the “procyclicality of fiscal policy is a puzzle in search of 
explanation” (Talvi and Végh, 2000) but also because this type of evidence has been 
reported as proof of the destabilizing conduct of fiscal policy. For instance, based on a 
positive correlation between the growth rate of real government spending and output, 
Gavin et al. (1996) concluded that the volatility of the LAC economies had been 
augmented by highly procyclical fiscal responses. Agénor et al. (1999), Stein et al. (1999) 
and Talvi and Végh (2000) reported a positive correlation between Hodrick-Prescott 
filtered components of government spending and output in order to draw conclusions on 
how fiscal policy behaves over the business cycle. The striking result generated by the 
model economy is that the presence of such a feature says nothing about how polices are 
conducted over the business cycle. In the model economy, government spending follows 
an exogenous Markov process, which, by definition, does not take into account the 
endogenous state of the economy. The model proves that attributing intentionality to 
fiscal policy (i.e., policymakers increase government consumption during expansions and 
decrease it during recessions) on the basis of the above mentioned correlation is incorrect. 
This sheds doubt on how well-grounded the generally accepted claim that fiscal policy is 
procyclical in the developing world is. 
 
Lane (2003) proposes a regression-based measure of cyclicality of fiscal policy for 
OECD countries. To that end, he estimated an OLS regression of the growth rate of 
government spending against the growth rate of output (and a constant). I used Monte 
Carlo experiments to assess the power of this approach. A total of 1200 sets of time series 
were created by simulations, following the general procedure described before. Using 
unfiltered data, Lane’s regression was estimated as many times and a significance test 
was repeatedly applied to examine whether the approach rejects the hypothesis of no 
response of government spending to cyclical conditions, as should be the case in our 
model. The average estimated regression coefficient was 0.87 (0.62) and in 48% (37%) of 
the 1200 trials, it turned out to be significantly different from zero using a t-test with a 
nominal size of 5 percent for the economy populated by both Ricardian and non-
Ricardian (Ricardian) households. This exercise suggests - based on the difference 
between the nominal and empirical sizes of the t-test - that Lane’s approach fails to make 
the correct inference more often than expected. Additional Monte Carlo experiments 
indicated that regression-based measures of cyclicality are correct when current output 
growth is instrumented to control possible endogeneity bias. This methodology has not 
been employed until recently (see Galí and Perotti, 2003, for industrial countries; Fatás 
and Mihov, 2004, for a sample of industrial and developing countries). 
 
5.2 Automatic Stabilizers in the LAC Area 
 
Automatic Revenue Stabilizers 
 
The issue of the degree of stabilization provided by the tax structure is addressed by 
comparing the volatility of aggregate output in an economy with a given tax structure to 
that of an economy with lump-sum taxation (i.e., with  0 = ℘ ). In each simulated 
economy (including the reference economy with non-distortionary taxation), the level of 
tax collection is the same (15.7% of GDP, as in the benchmark parameterization). This   25
implies that economies under alternative tax structures combine distortionary taxation 
with lump-sum taxation (or transfers) to ensure a constant level of tax proceeds. The 
unconditional mean of government spending is also held constant. Notice that the ensuing 
discussion focuses exclusively on stabilization issues while disregarding efficiency and 
distribution implications, to use Musgrave’s (1959) famous division of the state into its 
three functional branches. 
 
Figures 7 and 8 depict relative output volatilities when a given parameter of the tax code 
is changed, while keeping the other tax parameters constant at their baseline calibration 
values and when the business cycle is driven by alternative forcing processes. In the 
economy depicted by Figure 7, households are fully optimizing while the economy of 
Figure 8 is inhabited by both Ricardian and non-Ricardian households. In the Barro-
Ramsey economy, income taxes are strongly destabilizing in the sense that tax rate 
increases rapidly translate into higher output volatilities across most sources of business 
fluctuations. However, when the business cycle is driven by technology shocks to the 
nontradable sector and to a lesser extent by technology shocks to the exportable sector, 
the positive relationship lessens considerably - to the point where the destabilizing effect 
practically disappears. In other words, tax rates are more destabilizing when the business 
cycle is driven primarily by fluctuations such as terms of trade shocks, lending spread 
shocks, world business cycle shocks and government spending shocks and much less so 
when driven by technology shocks. The same applies to the parameter determining the 
slope of the personal tax schedule, e.g., the degree of progressivity of the personal 
income tax is more destabilizing when the business cycle is driven primarily by terms of 
trade shocks, lending spread shocks, world business cycle shocks and government 
spending shocks and much less so when driven by technology shocks. 
 
Other features of the tax code to consider are the personal exemption level and the level 
exemption in the consumption tax base. Both features are unrelated to the business cycle, 
e.g., they neither smooth nor destabilize the business cycle. Regarding the deduction of 
new investment expenses, simulation results show that relative output volatilities are a 
decreasing function of the fraction of investment in physical capital that can be deducted 
from corporate income. This is the only feature of the tax code that, in an economy 
inhabited by fully optimizing households and hit by multiple shocks, operates like an 
automatic stabilizer. 
 
The introduction of non-optimizing households (Figure 8) flattens the relative volatility 
schedules quite dramatically (note the difference in the scale of the y-axes in Figures 7 
and 8). Under most alternative sources of business fluctuations, relative volatilities do not 
respond or respond only slightly to changes in tax code parameters. There is one salient 
exception to this. The consumption tax, the personal income tax rate and the degree of 
progressivity of the income tax tend to increase the volatility of the economy when the 
business cycle is driven mainly by terms of trade shocks. Otherwise, results seem to 
suggest an invariance property: the amplitude of the business cycle is independent of the 
tax structure. The obvious consequence is that business cycle swings are not dampened 
by the automatic revenue stabilizers. A cursory look at the LAC data reveals that a case 
can be made for this. Figure 9 relates the two measures of the size of the automatic 
revenue stabilizers (see section 2: the sensitivity of the budget balance to the cycle, SBB,   26
and Pechman’s indicator, PI) to two measures of GDP volatility (standard deviation of 
the Hodrick-Prescott filtered log-GDP and the volatility of the growth rate of GDP). The 
figure seems to support the view that automatic revenue stabilizers in the LAC region do 
not smooth nor exacerbate business cycle fluctuations. 
 
Figures 10 and 11 depict the ratio of consumption volatility to GDP volatility for each 
household group respectively. The spenders or non-Ricardian households exhibit much 
lower consumption volatility than savers, but nonetheless, relative volatilities in both 
groups are unrelated to the features of the tax code. 
 
The Stabilizing Role of Government Size 
 
Figure 12 plots relative output volatilities when the unconditional mean ratio of 
government spending to GDP is changed in the benchmark economy, while the tax 
parameters remain constant at their baseline calibration values and when the business 
cycle is driven by alternative forcing processes. Government size indeed plays the role of 
an automatic stabilizer that works across most sources of business fluctuations except if 
the source of fluctuations is government spending innovations. However, its smoothing 
effect is very weak. 
 
Greater effects are observed when the business cycle is mainly a result of lending spread 
and world business cycle innovations. In these cases, the doubling of the government 
sector share in the economy from 15% to 30% of GDP will reduce relative output 
volatilities by 25% and 18% respectively. For the remaining shocks, other than 
government spending shocks, the reduction in volatility is lower than 9%. 
 
An increase in the size of government has the annoying effect of making the economy 
more vulnerable to the government shock process. The government size variable is 
destabilizing when the business cycle is mainly due to government spending shocks. 
Simulations with multiple shocks (“all shocks” curve in figure 12) indicate that relative 
output volatilities slowly decrease until the size of government reaches about 12% of 
GDP. Thereafter, the destabilizing effect of government shocks starts to dominate other 
stabilizing forces and relative volatilities slowly increase with government size. 
 
At first glance the overall results seem to be at odds with Figure 1 which shows that, in 
the LAC region, there is a positive relationship between government size and output 
volatility. Figure 13 shows that, in a broader sample of developing countries, the 
relationship between government size and volatility is weak, as the model predicts. The 




6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Earlier work on LAC fiscal policy is complemented and extended in this paper in several 
key respects. Previous work has singled out the issue of procyclicality of discretionary 
policy as its main focus. Here, the existing characterization has been enriched by   27
focusing on the non-discretionary component of fiscal policy. To do so, the size of the 
automatic revenue stabilizers in Latin America has been measured following standard 
methodologies and the analysis has found that they are small relative to developed 
economies and not very responsive to cyclical conditions. 
 
Despite the small size of the stabilizers, policymakers as well as analysts attribute - in a 
mechanistic fashion - a certain capacity to offset fluctuations to automatic stabilizers of a 
given size. In this paper, the smoothing role of the automatic revenue stabilizers has been 
assessed within a dynamic, stochastic, small open economy model with multiple shocks, 
capturing the fact that the region’s business cycle is far from being driven by purely 
demand shocks. This paper has shown that standard measures of the size of the automatic 
stabilizers do not provide useful information about the potential stabilizing role of the tax 
system. It was also shown that, in a typical LAC economy, in contrast to Keynesian 
predictions, the degree of smoothing provided by the automatic revenue stabilizers, 
described by various properties of the tax system, is negligible. All in all, the simulation 
results seem to suggest an invariance property for middle-income countries: the 
amplitude of the business cycle is independent of the tax structure. 
 
The model economy also lent itself to evaluating the stabilizing effect of government size 
as measured by the GDP ratio of primary government spending. Simulation results 
suggest that government size indeed plays the role of an automatic stabilizer that works 
across most sources of business fluctuations, but the overall smoothing effect is very 
weak. In addition, as the size of government increases, government spending shocks 
become a very strong destabilizing force which ends up offsetting its smoothing effect. 
 
The usual policy claim that the adoption of a given structural fiscal rule lets the automatic 
fiscal stabilizers work is vacuous in practice. Fiscal rules of the type embedded in the 
Maastricht Treaty and SGP, for instance, when adopted by an average LAC economy, 
will not allow the public sector non-discretionary finances to play a countercyclical role 
in the economy. The design of fiscal rules or the design of an institutional framework for 
the region’s fiscal policy that can provide the required discipline while preserving enough 
flexibility is still an open question. This is likely to be an important direction for future 
research. 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
Cyclical Sensitivity of the Fiscal Position 
 
 
A. Cyclical Sensitivity of the Budget (SBB) 
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Figure 3 
Government Size in LAC and Developed Countries 
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Figure 4 
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Figure 5 




























































































































































































































































































































Automatic Stabilizers Response to Cyclical Conditions 
 
 
5% significance 10% significance Not significant
Note: Figures depict the coefficient β associated with the output gap variable in the following (country-by-country) regression:  


























































































































































































































































































































































   38
Figure 7 
Simulation Results: Relative Output Volatilities with Only Ricardian Households 
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Figure 8 
Simulation Results: Tax Structure and Relative Output Volatilities 
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Figure 9 
Automatic Revenue Stabilizers and Business Cycle Volatility 
 
 
A. Cyclical Sensitivity of the Budget (SBB) 
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Figure 10 
Simulation Results: Relative Consumption Volatilities of Non-Ricardian Households 
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Figure 11 
Simulation Results: Relative Consumption Volatilities of Optimizing Households 
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Figure 12 
Simulation Results: Government Spending and Relative Output Volatilities 
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Figure 13 
The Stabilizing Role of Government Size in a Broader Sample 
 
 
LOW INCOME COUNTRIES: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo Democratic Republic, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Zimbabwe
MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES: Argentina, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala, Hungary, Iran, Jordan, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Singapore, South Africa, SriLanka, Swaziland, Thailand, Tunisia, Uruguay, Venezuela  
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Table 1 
LAC: GDP Composition 
(average 1990-2000 shares of GDP) 
 
Private Government Private Trade
Consumption Expenditures Investment Balance
Argentina 0.727 0.113 0.167 -0.007
Bolivia 0.768 0.174 0.131 -0.073
Brazil 0.611 0.193 0.201 -0.005
Chile 0.646 0.134 0.217 0.003
Colombia 0.663 0.191 0.160 -0.013
Costa Rica 0.698 0.159 0.171 -0.029
Dominican Republic 0.790 0.116 0.168 -0.073
Ecuador 0.674 0.138 0.178 0.010
El Salvador 0.874 0.125 0.139 -0.138
Guatemala 0.851 -0.067
Haiti 0.888 0.089 0.161 -0.138
Honduras 0.665 -0.081
Mexico 0.685 0.123 0.210 -0.017
Nicaragua 0.875 0.278 0.192 -0.346
Panama 0.625 0.161 0.231 -0.016
Paraguay 0.822 0.105 0.207 -0.133
Peru 0.731 0.121 0.181 -0.032
Uruguay 0.722 0.140 0.133 0.004
Venezuela 0.676 0.109 0.148 0.067
mean 0.736 0.145 0.176 -0.057
median 0.722 0.104 0.203 -0.029
min 0.611 0.059 0.150 -0.346
max 0.888 0.200 0.305 0.067
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank)  46
Table 2 
LAC: Import Composition 
(average 1990-2000 shares of GDP) 
 
Consumption Capital Intermediate Total
Goods Goods Goods
Argentina 0.014 0.036 0.031 0.081
Bolivia 0.042 0.076 0.090 0.208
Brazil 0.012 0.021 0.037 0.069
Chile 0.043 0.059 0.141 0.242
Colombia 0.025 0.050 0.068 0.142
Costa Rica 0.080 0.067 0.229 0.376
Dominican Republic 0.101 0.055 0.134 0.290
Ecuador 0.041 0.065 0.097 0.203
El Salvador 0.081 0.068 0.122 0.272
Guatemala 0.062 0.061 0.107 0.230
Haiti 0.112 0.025 0.063 0.200
Honduras 0.120 0.105 0.201 0.425
Mexico 0.025 0.034 0.178 0.237
Nicaragua 0.162 0.152 0.264 0.578
Panama 0.052 0.064 0.186 0.302
Paraguay 0.238 0.084 0.086 0.408
Peru 0.034 0.038 0.060 0.132
Uruguay 0.048 0.052 0.061 0.161
Venezuela 0.032 0.054 0.069 0.154
mean 0.070 0.061 0.117 0.248
median 0.048 0.059 0.097 0.230
min 0.012 0.021 0.031 0.069
max 0.238 0.152 0.264 0.578
Source: LDB and World Development Indicators (World Bank )  47
Table 3 
LAC: Tax Revenue Composition 
(average 1990-2000 shares of GDP) 
 
Consumption Social Security Taxes on Taxes on  Taxes on  Other Taxes Total
Taxes Contributions Income Corporate Income Personal Income
Argentina 0.057 0.045 0.014 0.006 0.121
Bolivia 0.080 0.016 0.010 0.016 0.122
Brazil 0.072 0.061 0.042 0.040 0.215
Chile 0.124 0.015 0.040 0.009 0.187
Colombia 0.062 0.046 0.002 0.109
Costa Rica 0.097 0.058 0.022 0.002 0.179
Dominican Republic 0.108 0.006 0.026 0.002 0.142
Ecuador 0.065 0.089 0.003 0.157
El Salvador 0.074 0.028 0.003 0.104
Guatemala 0.061 0.019 0.003 0.084
Haiti
Honduras
Mexico 0.089 0.019 0.048 0.003 0.159
Nicaragua 0.179 0.034 0.034 0.007 0.255
Panama 0.070 0.049 0.048 0.010 0.177
Paraguay 0.070 0.007 0.018 0.012 0.107
Peru 0.096 0.015 0.026 0.011 0.147
Uruguay 0.111 0.081 0.028 0.032 0.253
Venezuela 0.055 0.007 0.083 0.004 0.149
mean 0.086 0.032 0.037 0.025 0.012 0.010 0.157
median 0.074 0.019 0.028 0.006 0.149
min 0.055 0.006 0.010 0.002 0.084
max 0.179 0.081 0.089 0.040 0.255
Source: Government Finance Statistics database (IMF ) and World Development Indicators
Consumption taxes = Taxes on goods and services + Taxes on international trade 
Taxes on corporate income = Taxes on income*0.68. Where the fraction 0.68 is the average share of corporate income
in income taxes in a sample of 7 LAC economies 
Taxes on personal income = Taxes on income*0.32  48
Table 4 
LAC: Total Government Debt, External Debt and Physical Capital Stock 
(share of GDP) 
 
Public Debt Long-Term Capital
General Government External Debt Stock
Argentina 0.380 0.319 2.54
Bolivia 0.595 0.696 3.17
Brazil 0.466 0.252 3.11
Chile 0.395 0.387 2.49
Colombia 0.361 0.295 2.38
Costa Rica 0.345 0.333 2.44
Dominican Republic 0.275 0.335 2.95
Ecuador 0.773 0.727 3.14
El Salvador 0.301 0.273 2.24
Guatemala 0.160 0.218 2.10
Haiti 0.000 0.303
Honduras 0.957 1.046 2.34
Mexico 0.380 0.304 3.06
Nicaragua 3.130 3.934 2.41
Panama 0.731 0.544 2.86
Paraguay 0.216 0.246 3.08
Peru 0.525 0.474 3.50
Uruguay 0.283 0.253 2.62
Venezuela 0.328 0.463 3.62
mean 0.558 0.600 2.781
median 0.380 0.333 2.741
min 0.000 0.218 2.103
max 3.130 3.934 3.621
Source: for public debt: Moody's
            for external debt: World Development Indicators
            for capital stock: Loayza, et al. (2002)  
Public debt figures correspond to averages over the 1995-2000 period
Chile and Mexico data correspond to the 1999-2000 period average
External debt figures correspond to averages over the 1990-2000 period  49
Table 5 



























Source: Senhadji and Montenegro (1999)   50
Table 6 
Calibrated Parameter Values 
 
Parameter Description Value
foreign interest rate 0.04
subjective discount factor 0.9132
parameter determining elasticity of substitution between consumption goods -0.22
share parameter in CES consumption aggregator 0.8529
parameter determining elasticity of substitution between investment goods -0.22
share parameter in CES investment function 0.6212
scale parameter in Armington-type CES investment function 1.9260
rate of depreciation of the stock of physical capital 0.0633
labor share parameter in the production function 0.5013
parameter determining elasticity of substitution between capital and intermediate inputs 0.2650
relative weight of capital in CES aggregator of capital-intermedite input services     0.8970
parameter determining intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply  1.60
weighting parameter for the disutility of working time 3.2350
production function scaling parameter 14.8627
export demand function price elasticity -1.25
export demand function income elasticity 1.06
fraction of constrained households 0.60
Parameter Description Value
consumption tax rate 0.1495
corporate income tax rate 0.0947
personal income average tax rate 0.1572
fraction of physical investment deducted from business taxable income  1.0
parameter determining the slope of the personal income tax schedule 0.0
fraction of consumption exempted from the consumption tax 0.2
fraction of personal income exempted from the income taxation 0.5




x n φ = φ
x n χ = χ
x n δ = δ
x n γ = γ
x n ω = ω
x n ν = ν
ξ



















Cyclical Properties of the Representative LAC and Model Economies 
 
Relative Output First Order Relative Output First Order Relative Output First Order
Variable (x) Volatility Correlation Autocorrelation Volatility Correlation Autocorrelation Volatility Correlation Autocorrelation
Output (y = GDP) 1.00 1.00 0.63 1.00 1.00 0.38 1.00 1.00 0.41
Disposable income 1.04 0.95 0.61 1.08 1.00 0.37 1.09 1.00 0.40
Consumption 1.26 0.76 0.51 0.92 0.55 0.44 0.91 0.43 0.49
Investment 4.16 0.76 0.46 4.16 0.71 0.30 4.16 0.67 0.26
Trade balance-output ratio 0.71 -0.52 0.35 0.24 -0.21 0.30 0.36 -0.20 0.28
Primary government spending 2.83 0.50 0.38 2.83 0.32 0.37 2.83 0.32 0.37
Tax revenue 2.71 0.49 0.41 0.69 -0.49 0.32 0.74 0.71 0.53
Government debt-output ratio 1.23 -0.75 0.73 1.23 -0.47 0.38 1.00 -0.54 0.36
Source: LAC averages are taken from tables 8, 9 and 10.
LAC Averages Model (Benchmark parameterization)* Economy of Ricardian Households*
* The model's second moments are means of statistics computed for each of 200 simulations. Each simulation is 228 periods long and to compute statistics the first 200
observations are discarded. 28 periods is the average number of observations in the sample of LAC countries. Before computing second moments, each simulated time
series (except for GDP ratios) is logged and then HP filtered following the same procedure applied to compute LAC statistics.
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Table 8 
LAC: Standard Deviations (Volatilities) Relative to Output 
 
Disposable Consumption Investment Trade Government Tax Government
Income Balance Spending Revenue Debt
to GDP to GDP
Argentina 0.94 1.10 2.73 0.32 3.41 3.99 0.82
Bolivia 0.94 1.01 4.62 0.66 outlier outlier 3.07
Brazil 1.00 1.28 3.10 0.24 4.00 2.88 1.64
Chile 1.06 1.84 3.85 0.96 1.67 1.43 1.62
Colombia 1.11 1.08 5.64 1.00 3.06 2.95 1.24
Costa Rica 1.12 1.43 4.17 0.93 3.12 1.98 0.97
Dominican Republic 0.98 1.45 3.93 0.74 3.65 3.47 0.71
Ecuador 1.28 1.00 3.94 0.79 3.44 3.06 1.53
El Salvador 0.91 1.44 3.25 0.65 2.24 2.34 0.64
Guatemala 0.96 0.87 4.62 0.43 3.31 4.02 0.44
Mexico 0.98 1.17 3.58 0.71 3.19 1.62 1.17
Nicaragua 1.06 1.44 outlier 0.86 3.31 2.34 2.21
Panama 0.86 1.50 6.91 0.70 1.61 2.65 1.22
Paraguay 0.95 1.44 3.28 0.98 2.61 2.49 0.83
Peru 1.00 0.97 3.32 0.34 1.46 1.97 0.55
Uruguay 0.93 1.24 3.79 0.56 2.12 2.19 0.73
Venezuela 1.53 1.16 5.78 1.15 3.01 4.02 1.50
Average 1.04 1.26 4.16 0.71 2.83 2.71 1.23
Median 0.98 1.24 3.93 0.71 3.12 2.65 1.17
Max 1.53 1.84 19.07 1.15 7.29 7.90 3.07
Min 0.86 0.87 2.73 0.24 1.46 1.43 0.44
Disposable income = GDP-taxes revenue; consumption = household final consumption; investment =gross capital formation; trade
balance = exports of goods and services - imports of goods and services. All variables except net exports and government debt are
in per capita terms and in logaritms; all variables filtered with the Hodrick_Prescott filter. Volatility is the percentage deviation from
 the Hodrick-Prescott trend. Tax data are from the IMF Government Finance Statistics database. Government debt figures are cons-
tructed as indicated in the text. The remaining data are taken from the World Development Indicators database.     53
Table 9 
LAC: Output Correlations 
 
Disposable Consumption Investment Trade Government Tax Government
Income Balance Spending Revenue Debt
to GDP to GDP
Argentina 0.97 0.93 0.91 -0.88 0.68 0.59 -0.94
Bolivia 0.90 0.74 0.43 0.02 0.15 0.40 -0.48
Brazil 0.91 0.30 0.83 -0.64 0.38 0.51 -0.55
Chile 0.97 0.93 0.72 -0.90 0.51 0.60 -0.91
Colombia 0.96 0.84 0.68 -0.49 -0.01 0.18 -0.79
Costa Rica 0.97 0.83 0.87 -0.64 0.63 0.23 -0.87
Dominican Republic 0.91 0.53 0.69 -0.26 0.61 0.53 -0.67
Ecuador 0.91 0.86 0.68 -0.44 0.51 0.01 -0.92
El Salvador 0.98 0.89 0.84 -0.65 0.36 0.78 -0.59
Guatemala 0.95 0.98 0.67 -0.24 0.66 0.52 -0.88
Mexico 0.98 0.95 0.85 -0.66 0.62 0.76 -0.46
Nicaragua 0.88 0.27 0.59 -0.17 0.34 0.47 -0.48
Panama 0.98 0.51 0.83 -0.60 0.63 0.85 -0.88
Paraguay 0.98 0.64 0.92 -0.52 0.52 0.69 -0.94
Peru 0.97 0.95 0.70 -0.51 0.80 0.56 -0.71
Uruguay 0.95 0.92 0.91 -0.79 0.54 0.73 -0.86
Venezuela outlier 0.82 0.82 -0.55 0.56 -0.03 -0.81
Average 0.95 0.76 0.76 -0.52 0.50 0.49 -0.75
Median 0.96 0.84 0.77 -0.53 0.53 0.53 -0.80
Max 0.98 0.98 0.92 0.02 0.80 0.85 -0.46
Min 0.82 0.27 0.43 -0.90 -0.01 -0.03 -0.94
Disposable income = GDP-taxes revenue; consumption = household final consumption; investment = gross capital formation; trade
balance = exports of goods and services  - imports of goods and services. All variables except net exports and government debt are
in per capita terms and in logaritms; all variables filtered with the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Output correlation is the contemporaneous
correlation with GDP. Tax data are from the IMF Government Finance Statistics database. Government debt figures are constructed
as indicated in the text. The remaining data are taken from the World Development Indicators database.   54
Table 10 
LAC: Persistence of Macroeconomic Aggregates 
 
GDP Disposable Consumption Investment Trade Government Tax Government
Income Balance Spending Revenue Debt
to GDP to GDP
Argentina 0.43 0.32 0.46 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.43 0.60
Bolivia 0.84 0.79 0.74 0.26 0.47 0.40 0.42 0.76
Brazil 0.64 0.52 0.49 0.56 0.37 0.28 0.43 0.72
Chile 0.58 0.52 0.47 0.26 0.50 0.60 0.56 0.61
Colombia 0.67 0.61 0.53 0.61 0.71 0.34 0.48 0.82
Costa Rica 0.64 0.71 0.53 0.56 0.50 0.39 0.19 0.73
Dominican Republic 0.47 0.52 -0.02 0.40 -0.05 0.46 0.30 0.66
Ecuador 0.48 0.50 0.63 0.18 0.08 0.26 0.04 0.67
El Salvador 0.80 0.77 0.74 0.60 0.51 0.56 0.65 0.83
Guatemala 0.83 0.80 0.82 0.47 0.29 0.54 0.64 0.80
Mexico 0.64 0.59 0.62 0.44 0.54 0.46 0.48 0.83
Nicaragua 0.54 0.56 0.30 outlier -0.08 0.29 0.49 0.79
Panama 0.61 0.61 0.16 0.38 0.12 0.08 0.39 0.61
Paraguay 0.73 0.70 0.27 0.67 0.20 0.60 0.55 0.81
Peru 0.62 0.57 0.67 0.51 0.51 0.47 0.33 0.80
Uruguay 0.68 0.66 0.58 0.77 0.56 0.20 0.41 0.66
Venezuela 0.54 outlier 0.66 0.26 0.16 0.09 0.14 0.66
Average 0.63 0.61 0.51 0.46 0.35 0.38 0.41 0.73
Median 0.64 0.60 0.55 0.45 0.42 0.40 0.42 0.75
Max 0.84 0.80 0.82 0.77 0.71 0.60 0.65 0.83
Min 0.43 0.50 -0.02 -0.05 -0.08 0.08 0.04 0.61
Disposable income = GDP-taxes revenue; consumption = household final consumption; investment = gross capital formation; trade balance = exports
of goods and services - imports of goods and services.  All variables except net exports and government debt are expressed in per capita terms and in
logaritms; all variables filtered with the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Persistence is defined as first order autocorrelation. 
Tax data are from the IMF Government Finance Statistics database.  Government debt figures are constructed as indicated in the text.  The remaining  
data are taken from the World Development Indicators database.  